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GETTING UNDER FIDO’S SKIN:
ANALYZING THE OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY PET MICROCHIPPING
LAWS
© 2011 Stephen D. Lott

I. Introduction
The Humane Society of the United States estimates that shelters euthanize
between three and four million dogs and cats each year.1 While many animal welfare
organizations have continuously called for an end to animal euthanasia, the “reality is that
shelters [have] . . . limited space and finite resources . . . .”2 Even so, the number of
animals euthanized by shelters has decreased nearly 22% since the 1970s.3 Still, animal
advocates assert that we can do better.4
Companies such as HomeAgain and AVID Identification Systems claim they
have the solution.5 Their solution is an implantable microchip about the size of a “grain
of rice,” which the companies say provides a more reliable means of reuniting lost pets
with their owners.6 “While collars can fall off and tattoos can be removed, pet microchip
identification is a permanent way to ensure that if [someone’s] pet goes missing, the

1

HSUS Pet Overpopulation Estimates, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/pet_overpopulation/facts/overpopulation_estimates.html.
2
Common Questions About Animal Shelters, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.humanesociety.org/animal_community/resources/qa/common_questions_on_shelters.html#Wh
y_arent_all_animal_shelters_nokill_she.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
The Lost Pet Reality, HOMEAGAIN (Feb. 1, 2011), http://public.homeagain.com/; About AVID, AVID
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.avidid.com/stoddard.html.
6
Jane McGrath, How Pet Microchipping Works, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://animals.howstuffworks.com/pets/pet-travel/pet-microchip.htm/printable (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).

authorities can trace the ownership of the animal back to [the owner].”7 Moreover, the
process of “chipping” a dog or cat is relatively simple. The microchips, which utilize a
type of technology known as radio frequency identification (RFID), are surgically
implanted in a fold of skin between the animal’s shoulder blades, a procedure that
advocates say is quick and painless to the animal.8
Convinced of the efficacy of RFID technology, a number of cities across the
United States, including Los Angeles and El Paso, have instituted, or are considering
instituting mandatory microchipping laws.9 These laws require pet owners to have
microchips implanted in their pets, and in some cases pay a fine for failure to do so.10 In
support of such laws, El Paso city councilman Beto O’Rourke noted that his “city’s goal
is ‘zero kill’ of animals, ‘which we’re nowhere near right now’ . . . . ‘We’re spending
$2.5 million every year housing, feeding and euthanizing those pets, and then dumping
them at the landfill.’”11 Likewise, Los Angeles councilman Tony Cardenas said that “[i]f
animals ‘aren’t chipped, it will [take] longer for them to be returned. It is a cost-saving
measure.’”12
However, not everyone is sold on the idea of mandatory microchipping. There
are those who object to mandatory microchipping laws on the grounds that forced

7

Jessica Hunter, Weighing the Benefits of Pet Microchip Identification, CONSUMER SAVVY TIPS,
http://www.consumersavvytips.org/weighing_the_benefits_of_pet_microchip_identification.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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McGrath, supra note 6.
Matthew C. Wright, Tags and Collars Becoming Passe with New Implants, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2006, at
A02; Gerrick D. Kennedy, Found Pets Might Get Microchips, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at A4.
10
MARION COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 4-10 (2009).
11
Wright, supra note 9.
12
Kennedy, supra note 9.
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chipping is unsafe, unnecessary, and in contravention of the rights of pet owners.13
Accordingly, they argue that “[t]he decision of whether or not to microchip an animal
belongs solely to the owner and should not be mandated by any government entity.”14
This principal argument is buttressed by a variety of legal and policy-based objections to
mandatory microchipping laws. This note will conduct a brief overview of several of the
most common objections and examine whether those who oppose mandatory
microchipping have any legs (or paws?) to stand on.
First, there is the argument that forced pet microchipping will set off an
unalterable chain of events that will ultimately lead to forced human microchipping.15
This slippery slope argument is popular because it conjures up chilling visions of Big
Brother-style government surveillance. However provocative such notions may be, this
note will argue that such fears are ultimately unfounded, largely because of the judicially
recognized fundamental right to privacy. The right to privacy includes the right to bodily
integrity, protecting people from government invasions of their person.16
Second, this note will address the argument that mandatory microchipping laws
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. This argument is rooted in an objection to
the creation of a database containing pet owners’ names and contact information.17 This

13

Mandatory Microchipping Makes Its Way From New York to Australia, FULLY VETTED (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.petmd.com/blogs/fullyvetted/2008/november/mandatory-microchipping-makes-its-way-newyork-australia.
14

Loretta Baughan, Declassifying Animals as Property, SPANIEL J.,
http://www.spanieljournal.com/46lbaughan.html (last updated Apr. 6, 2010).
15
KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS: HOW MAJOR
CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TRACK YOUR EVERY MOVE WITH RFID 218 (2005).
16
Gowri Ramachandran, Against the Right to Bodily Integrity: Of Cyborgs and Human Rights, 87 DENV.
U.L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
17
Is There a Chip in Your Future?, DOG POLITICS (Dec. 5, 2007),
http://www.dogpolitics.com/my_weblog/microchips_data_privacy/.
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objection, while somewhat undercut by the fact that most counties and/or municipalities
“already require[] pet owners to license their pets”18 is not completely without merit.
With licensing, the pet owner’s personal information is stored in a database
maintained by the government.19 With microchipping, however, such information is
stored in a database maintained by the manufacturer of the microchip.20 While it is
certainly true that many other private entities (e.g., credit card companies) maintain
databases containing customer information, it should be noted that legislation exists
which protects against the improper dissemination of that information.21 With pet
microchip databases, however, there is currently no analogous legislation protecting pet
owners.22
Third, this note will discuss several safety concerns cited by opponents of
mandatory microchipping. The first of these is the possible link between implantable
microchips and cancer. In several studies, mice implanted with RFID microchips
developed malignant tumors.23 However, the legitimacy of these studies has been called
into question by microchip proponents who claim that it is “an urban myth that
[microchips] cause cancer.”24
The other safety issue concerns the variation of microchip/scanner frequencies.
Depending on the manufacturer, pet microchips currently utilize one of three different
18

Mandatory Pet Microchipping, MENIFEE 24/7 NEWS & VIEWS OF MENIFEE, CA (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://www.menifee247.com/2009/01/mandatory-pet-microchipping.htm.
19

See, e.g., Pet License Information Database, BROWARD.ORG,
http://www.broward.org/animal/lostandfound/pages/petlicensedatabase.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
20
How Microchipping Works, HOMEAGAIN, http://public.homeagain.com/microchipping-facts.html (last
visited Feb. 1, 2011).
21
E.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
22
Kenneth A. Adler, RFID & Privacy Issues: A Snapshot of Proposed Laws, THE LEGAL SIDE,
http://www.thelenreid.com/resources/documents/0509_RFIDPN1.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
23
See, e.g., Todd Lewan, AP, Chip Implants Linked to Animal Tumors, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2007.
24
William Hageman, Can Something This Small (Actual Size) Help Bring Him Back Home?; Microchips
Reunite Pets and Their People, but There’s a Human Glitch, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2008, at C1.
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frequencies.25 This disparity can be fatal if the shelter that takes in a lost pet does not
have the right scanner.26 Universal scanners27 exist, though many microchip companies
have responded by encrypting their microchips, allowing only that company’s scanner to
read the microchip.28
Fourth, this note will address the issue of whether or not mandatory
microchipping constitutes a compensable taking. According to Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, forced microchipping arguably does
constitute a taking for which the pet’s owner must be compensated.29 This is due to the
fact that the procedure involves a permanent physical invasion of a person’s property.30
Finally, this note assesses the argument that “[m]andatory microchipping
denigrates the role of pets as family members.”31 Although the law has traditionally
treated animals as being no different from other types of personal property, a minority of
courts have recognized that companion animals are a unique type of property.32 Based
upon this recognition, anti-chipping advocates argue that given the special property status
of pets, owners should be given a choice as to how they identify their pets (i.e. the choice
between microchip, tattoo, or traditional collar and tag). This note will argue that such
arguments, while perhaps persuasive from a public policy standpoint, find little support
from the law.

25

McGrath, supra note 6.

26

Id.
Id. (explaining that universal scanners are scanners that can read microchips at all frequencies).
28
Id.
29
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
30
E.g., AVID Technology, AVID, http://www.avidid.com/technology/index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
31
FULLY VETTED, supra note 13.
32
Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314 passim (2007).
27
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II. What is RFID?
The microchips implanted in dogs and cats utilize what is known as radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology.33 This technology is characterized by
several features: “(i) a tag (transponder), which emits a unique identifier through radio
waves; (ii) an interrogator (scanner), which receives the signal and identifies the object;
and (iii) an associable database.”34 In addition, tags come in two forms, active and
passive.35
The type of tag currently used in animals is a form of passive RFID.36 Passive
RFID tags have “no battery and no internal power source. Rather [they] sit completely
inert in the animal, waiting to be read.”37 The tag consists of the actual microchip,
encapsulated by a plastic or biocompatible glass material.38 In addition to the microchip,
the capsule also contains “a tuning capacitor and an antenna coil. The capacitor receives
power and sends it to the microchip. The microchip’s information can then be picked up
through the antenna, which is a copper coil.”39 In the case of pet microchips, the data
stored on the microchip is an identification number.40 This number “matches [the pet
owner’s] name and contact information in a database.”41

33

McGrath, supra note 6.
Ian Kerr, The Internet of People?, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND
IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 337 (Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole Lucock eds., 2009).
35
Id.
36
McGrath, supra note 6.
37
Id.
38
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE
32 (2010).
39
McGrath, supra note 6.
40
Id.
41
Id.
34
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Passive RFID tags are not capable of actively transmitting any information stored
on them without the aid of a scanner.42 The scanner works as follows: “When set to the
correct frequency, the scanner ‘interrogates’ the microchip by invigorating the capacitor
with electromagnetic power. When energized, the microchip capsule sends radio signals
back to the scanner” transmitting the identification number stored on the microchip.43
The scanner then cross-references the number by syncing with an associable database.44
If a match is found, the pet owner’s name and contact information is sent from the
database back to the scanner and appears on the screen for the user to read.45 In the best
case scenario, Fido’s owner is then called and man, and man’s best friend, enjoy a tearful
reunion as scientists and Humane Society staff exchange high fives and pat each other on
the back.

III. First Pets, Then People? Analyzing the RFID Slippery Slope
One of the most provocative arguments put forward by opponents of mandatory
pet microchipping is that such legislation will ultimately lead to mandatory
microchipping laws for humans; what this note will refer to as the “first pets, then
people” argument. While the scenarios envisioned by proponents of this argument
certainly make for an entertaining Blade Runner-esque cyberpunk film, the likelihood of
them actually happening is circumvented by some of the oldest principles of the common
law.46 Nonetheless, such arguments, because they appeal to fears about overzealous
42

Kerr, supra note 34.
McGrath, supra note 6.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Wong Kin Yuen, On the Edge of Spaces: “Blade Runner”, “Ghost in the Shell”, and Hong Kong's
Cityscape, 27 SCI. FICTION STUDIES 1, 1 (2000), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/4240846 (noting that
“[i]t is widely acknowledged that Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982/1992) initiated a whole tradition of
43
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government surveillance, permeate the debate over mandatory microchipping. As radio
personality and anti-RFID activist Katherine Albrecht has said, “for a lot of people
there’s a real worry that if we allow the government to say we must microchip our
animals then it’s just a matter of time before that government says we must microchip our
children and even ourselves.”47
In fact, Albrecht is one of the chief proponents of the idea that mandatory animal
microchipping will eventually lead to forced human microchipping.48 In her book,
Spychips: How Major Corporations and Government Plan to Track your Every Move
with RFID, Albrecht describes quite colorfully the transition from innocuous animal
microchipping to invasive human chipping: “Pets and livestock are already being
chipped, and there are those who believe humans should be next. . . the end point will be
microchips embedded in our flesh.”49 In Albrecht’s opinion:
[I]t’s just a matter of time before society finds a compelling reason to
permanently identify and track ‘captive’ populations with implantable
microchips. First, we’ll implant society’s outcasts – like prisoners and the
homeless – justifying it as a security measure. When such chipping
becomes commonplace and hence ‘acceptable’ in those populations,
society may expand those efforts to semi-captive populations like the
elderly, school kids, and the military. Next will come government
employees and those working for major corporations. After all, the
argument will go, no one’s forcing you to do it – although if you don’t go
along, you can kiss your paycheck goodbye. Finally, when most everyone
else has been signed up, they’ll start coming for the rest of us. Nicely at
first, then in earnest.50
cult movies later grouped under the label ‘cyberpunk.’”); In addition to being legal untenable, some say
mandatory human microchipping is also highly impractical. The Information Technology Association of
American, for example, has stated that “[u]biquitous ‘Big Brother’ surveillance around the world would
require billions and billions of readers and antennas within 10 to 30 feet of a tag as well as open access to
the data associated with or stored in the tag.” RFID: Myths and Urban Legends, INFO. TECH. ASS’N AM.,
http://www.rfidinfo.jp/whitepaper/787.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
47
Pet Lovers Protest Micro-Chipping Law, CBN NEWS (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/553562.aspx.
48
Id.
49
ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 15.
50
Id.
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Albrecht’s allusion to Martin Niemöller’s "First they came ..." is obvious (and not the
only reference she makes to Nazi totalitarianism).51 However, before dismissing
Albrecht’s grim, Orwellian forecast as the paranoid ramblings of a conspiracy theorist,
one needs to examine the slippery slope argument implied by her statement.
As a construct, the slippery slope argument certainly does not suffer from a lack
of either supporters or detractors. Many eminent legal thinkers, including James Madison
and Hugo Black, have been of the opinion that slippery slopes are “a real cause for
concern.”52 Conversely, other jurists “such as Lincoln, Holmes, and Frankfurter have
recognized [that] slippery slope objections can’t always be dispositive.”53
Albrecht’s slippery slope argument, succinctly summarized, goes like this:
Mandatory pet microchipping will change societal norms such that, once people get used
to microchips in pets, the step up to microchips in children and the elderly will seem like
a less radical step. Once those classes of people have microchips, it will be but a short
jump to everyone having to have a microchip.
This type of argument is what law professor Eugene Volokh has termed the
“attitude-altering slippery slope.”54 The idea is that “[d]ecision A . . . will eventually lead
to B . . . because A and similar decisions will slowly change the public’s mind . . .
‘desensitize’ people in preparation for a future step.”55 Logically, this idea seems sound.

51

Id. at 211. According to Albrecht, “[t]here’s little doubt . . . that were the Holocaust to happen today, the
Nazi predators would have done more than issue yellow stars to mark their victims. They would almost
certainly have tagged every Jew with a mandatory RFID implant.” Id.
52
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1029 (2003).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1077.
55
Id.
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However, there are some problems with the efficacy of this model as applied to
Albrecht’s progression, namely the huge leap from animals to humans. As Volokh notes:
Attitudes . . . are altered by the law’s justifications as they are perceived.
Say people conclude that A’s enactment means that A is probably good,
and that [other proposals are] . . . probably also good if [they are]
analogous to A. Whether B is seen as analogous to A turns on which
particular justification people ascribe to A, and see as being legitimized by
A’s enactment.56
Thus, if people felt that mandatory pet microchipping was justified by the idea that
government surveillance via internal body implant is tolerable regardless of the species
being surveilled, then perhaps we are not that far away from a Brave New World after
all.57 Fortunately, however, it is safe to say that most people probably do not recognize
such a justification as being legitimized by mandatory microchipping laws. Rather, if
people see pet microchipping as analogous to human microchipping, they do so in a very
qualified way. Whether they realize it or not, most people probably perceive an implicit
caveat in the justification behind mandatory pet microchipping. That caveat is that there
is a fundamental difference between domesticated animals and people; that forced animal
microchipping is okay, forced human microchipping is not (or as Orwell would say, “four
legs good, two legs bad”58).
On balance, Volokh says, “[t]he slippery slope is in some ways a helpful
metaphor, but as with many metaphors, it starts by enriching our vision and ends by
clouding it. We need to go beyond the metaphor, and examine the specific mechanisms

56

Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
In Aldous Huxley’s classic dystopian novel Brave New World the entire planet is controlled by the socalled World State, an invasive totalitarian government very similar to the one personified by Big Brother
in George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD passim (1932); GEORGE
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM passim (1945).
58
ORWELL, supra note 57, passim.
57
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that cause the phenomenon that the metaphor describes . . . .”59 In the case of mandatory
human microchipping, such mechanisms, no matter how much grease were to be added to
the gears, would inevitably come to a grinding halt, obstructed by the overwhelming
weight of legal precedent protecting people against such an odious invasion of their
persons.
The number of methods by which the government keeps tabs on its citizens is
numerous. Indeed, the government has information about people via driver’s licenses,
social security numbers, court documents, deeds to houses, pet licenses, and a plethora of
other documents maintained as public records. However, a clear line can be drawn at the
human body. As Judge Cardozo once said, “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”60
The integrity of the human body is a deeply engrained part of our common law
history. For instance, “[t]he fundamental principle of medical jurisprudence [is] that a
patient must consent to any surgical procedure.”61 Consent, in turn, “is derived from a
fundamental common law principle that volenti non fit injuria (‘to one who is willing, no
wrong is done.’).”62 Indeed, any “surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”63 Without a
doubt, the implantation of a microchip into a person’s body constitutes a surgical
procedure, defined as “a medical procedure involving an incision with instruments.”64 A

59

Volokh, supra note 52, at 1137.
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914).
61
CHARLOTTE L. LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW: LEGAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION 50 (2d ed. 1983).
62
Id. at 16.
63
Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129-30.
64
Surgical Procedure Definition, WORDNET: A LEXICAL DATABASE FOR ENGLISH,
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=surgical%20procedure (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
60
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medical procedure, in turn, is defined as “a procedure employed by [a] medical or dental
practitioner[].”65
Moreover, the right to bodily integrity, which emanates from the right to privacy,
has long been considered to be a fundamental right.66 In 1891, the Supreme Court
decided Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.67 Writing for the majority, Justice Gray
made clear that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.”68
As the right to bodily integrity is a fundamental right, any law restricting it will be
subject to strict scrutiny review by the courts.69 In order to pass this highest of standards,
any law requiring mandatory human microchipping would only be upheld if it were
“proved necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.”70 In addition, the
government would have to show “that it cannot achieve its objective through any less
discriminatory alternative.”71 Thus, any law requiring people to have microchips
implanted in their bodies would likely fail strict scrutiny analysis. As patent attorney Dr.

65

Medical Procedure Definition, WORDNET: A LEXICAL DATABASE FOR ENGLISH,
http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=medical+procedure&sub=Search+WordNet&o2=&o0=1&
o7=&o5=&o1=1&o6=&o4=&o3=&h=0 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
66
Ronald W. Jenkins, RECENT DEVELOPMENT: Constitutional Law--Due Process--Fundamental Right to
Bodily Integrity--Protective Services for Elderly Persons, 46 TENN. L. REV. 425, 427 (1979);
Ramachandran, supra note 16, at 1 (“Creating a list of fundamental human rights is a controversial project,
but there is one right that appears in many lists - a right to bodily integrity, security, or control over one’s
own body.”).
67
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
68
Id. at 251.
69
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
319 (1976) ( Marshall, J., Dissenting).
70
ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645 (Vicki Beenet et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2002).
71
Id.

12

Elaine M. Ramesh notes, “[a]lthough the compelling governmental interest might be
evident, microchip implantation is not the least restrictive means to achieve objectives.
Hence, mandatory implantation would not be legal.”72 Thus, in the absence of a radical
Constitutional amendment, we can consider the idea of forced human microchipping
short-circuited.

IV. Is Forced Pet Microchipping an Invasion of the Owner’s Privacy?
Another one of the arguments promulgated by anti-chippers is the idea that
mandatory microchipping constitutes a derogation of pet owners’ privacy rights. While
RFID critics acknowledge that “[t]here is no right not to be observed . . . ,” opponents of
mandatory chipping maintain that “surveillance, regardless of whether or not it is
technologically assisted, assaults human dignity and changes behavior patterns, thereby
reducing self-determination.”73 Such assertions, while undoubtedly sincere, ignore the
fact that county and municipal government authorities were in the practice of storing pet
owner identification information in databases long before the advent of RFID
microchips.74
Most cities in the United States have pet licensing laws which require pet owners
to register their dog or cat, acquire tags and pay a licensing fee.75 County and municipal
authorities have the power to enact and enforce such regulations because they “partake of

72

Elaine M. Ramesh, Time Enough? Consequences of Human Microchip Implantation, RISK: HEALTH,
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT, No. 8, 1997, at 373, available at http://law.unh.edu/risk/vol8/fall/ramesh.htm.
73
Anne Uteck, Ubiquitous Computing and Spatial Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL:
ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 90 (Ian Kerr, Valerie Steeves & Carole
Lucock eds., 2009).
74
Diane E. Bandy, Collecting Antique Dog Tags, THE BARK, http://www.thebark.com/content/collectingantique-dog-tags (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
75
H.W. HANNAH & DONALD F. STORM, LAW FOR THE VETERINARIAN AND LIVESTOCK OWNER 141 (1959).
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police power inherent in the state.”76 Police powers allow local government authorities to
“pass ordinances [aimed at] protect[ing] the health, welfare or convenience of [their]
residents.”77 As long as the ordinances passed are “reasonable, they will be held
constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.”78
Assuming for the moment that a particular mandatory microchipping law is a
reasonable exercise of the city or county’s police power, the question must be asked: how
is an RFID database any different than the pet-licensing databases already in existence?
Both contain the same information about the pet owner. For example, in Broward
County, Florida, section 4-11 of the county’s Animal Care and Regulation Ordinance
states that “[a]ny person who owns or keeps in Broward County a dog or cat two (2)
months of age or older shall have such dog or cat licensed by and in Broward County.”79
Every dog or cat is required to wear its county license.80 After purchasing a license from
the county, the pet owner’s personal information is entered into a database maintained by
the Broward County Animal Care and Regulation Division.81
The difference between pet license databases and pet microchip databases is that
with licenses, it is the county/municipality that maintains the database containing owner’s
personal information. With microchips, it is a private entity, the microchip manufacturer,
which maintains the information database. In this regard, a potential privacy threat exists
from “the entity responsible for the [chip] and in control of the database . . . and from

76

Id. at 20.
Id.
78
Id. at 141.
79
BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES art. 11, § 4 (2009).
80
Animal Laws, BROWARD.ORG, http://www.broward.org/ANIMAL/RESOURCES/Pages/AnimalLaws.aspx
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
81
Pet License Information Database, supra note 19.
77
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anyone else that has gotten database access.”82 However, it is the same kind of threat that
exists with regard to any commercial entity that keeps records of its customers. As the
Information Technology Association of America put it, “bar codes, credit cards, and
loyalty cards already enable stores to link personally identifiable information to
purchases — with the approval of consumers. . . . RFID does not change the
equation . . . .”83
A counter argument would be that there are no laws that force people to get credit
cards or loyalty cards. Furthermore, consumer protection laws, such as the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA),84 exist which regulate the “privacy of information in the files of
consumer reporting agencies.”85 In the case of the FCRA, for example, “[a] consumer
reporting agency may provide information about [the consumer] only to people with a
valid need.”86 Those who object to mandatory pet microchipping on privacy grounds
might point to the lack of any analogous federal or state legislation protecting against the
improper dissemination of pet owner information.
This may simply be due to the relative novelty of RFID technology. As noted by
James X. Dempsey of the Center for Democracy & Technology, privacy law often has
trouble “[keeping] pace with technical innovation.”87 This is partly due to the constant
evolution of technology, but it is also a result of the mechanics of American government.
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As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[a] scheme of government like ours no
doubt at times feels the lack of power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly
moving authority;”88 “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives – or
the hallmarks – of democratic government.”89 In other words, the founders purposely
designed our government to be slow and burdensome, fraught with annoyances they
considered essential to protect against abuses of power. With this sort of system, it seems
the law is destined to always be one step behind the latest technological advancement.
Nonetheless, consumer privacy advocates, such as Consumers Against
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN), fully intend on holding
Congress’ feet to the proverbial fire. Several years ago, CASPIAN drafted the RFID
Right to Know Act of 2003, a proposal “which seeks amendments to the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Program, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Relating to
Misbranding, and the Federal Alcohol Administration Act (Title 15, Chapters 36 and
94).”90 This Act would prohibit businesses “from: 1) combining or linking an
individual’s non-public personal information with RFID tag identification information
beyond what is required to manage inventory; 2) disclosing such information to a nonaffiliated third party; or 3) using RFID tag identification information to identify an
individual.”91
In addition, although efforts at the federal level have been sluggish, a number of
states are proposing their own legislation, “address[ing] privacy concerns raised by the
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implementation of RFID technology . . . .”92 For example, in 2004 Representative David
Hogue proposed a bill in the Utah State House of Representatives that “would modify the
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act to protect against misuse of personal information
transferred through RFID.”93 Such efforts are a good sign that RFID privacy laws are on
the horizon.
Privacy advocates argue that surreptitious scanning of microchips by
unauthorized third parties poses another potential threat.94 This fear can be calmed,
however, because the type of microchips currently used in dogs and cats are a variety of
passive RFID that “[does] not broadcast personal identifying information directly.
Instead . . . [the chips] broadcast pointers to entries in a limited-access database
containing the [pet owner’s] personal identifying information.”95 As noted earlier, when
a pet’s microchip is scanned it conveys to the scanner a unique identification number,
which is then cross-referenced to a database containing the pet owner’s personal
information.96 Only those authorized to access the database are able to obtain the
owner’s information.97 Thus, as long as limited-access chips are used, the privacy threat
posed by surreptitious scanning should remain minimal.

V. Safety Concerns
Another objection to forced microchipping concerns the supposed health risks
associated with microchips. The safety of pet microchipping has been called into
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question on at least two different grounds. The first ground is the possibility that
microchips cause cancer in the animals into which they are implanted.
In 2004, the FDA approved implantable RFID microchips for human use.98 The
agency based its approval on “‘reasonable assurance’ [that] the device was safe.”99
However, soon after the FDA’s approval, a number of studies surfaced which suggested
that microchips might not be safe.100 As reported in the Chicago Tribune, “[a] series of
veterinary and toxicology studies dating to the mid-1990s, stated that the chip implants
had ‘induced’ malignant tumors in some lab mice and rats.”101 In one study, more than
10% of the mice implanted with microchips developed cancer.102 Furthermore, in nearly
every case in which cancer developed, “the malignant tumors, typically sarcomas, arose
at the site of the implants and grew to surround and fully encase the devices. In several
cases the tumors also metastasized or spread to other parts of the animals.”103 However,
the results and implications of these studies have been called into question.104
One explanation for the occurrence of the tumors, according to Ohio State
University veterinarian oncologist Dr. Cheryl London, may be that “it’s easier to cause
cancer in mice.”105 Dr. London further explained that “[t]ens of thousands of dogs have
been chipped . . . and veterinary pathologists haven’t reported outbreaks of related
sarcomas.”106 Echoing London’s view, Dr. Larry McGill of the American College of
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Veterinary Pathology stated, “‘[w]e looked at three or four thousand cats in 2003, and
there wasn’t a single instance of sarcoma induced by a microchip.’”107 Thus as of yet,
there is no final consensus as to whether implantable microchips cause cancer. As a
matter of public policy, pet owners not keen on having their pets chipped might argue
that more research needs to be done to determine the safety of microchips before owners
are forced to have the devices implanted into their pets.
The second alleged safety problem with pet microchipping is purportedly
irreconcilable frequency variation.108 Currently, there is no one standard frequency at
which pet microchips operate.109 Some microchips work at 125 kHz, while others use
128 kHz and 134.2 kHz.110 The scanners “need to be able to read the correct frequency”
in order to detect the microchip and read the identification number stored thereon.111
This means that if the person performing the scan does not have the right scanner, no
microchip will be detected and the technology’s purpose will be defeated. In one case,
this sort of technological hiccup had tragic consequences. In California, personnel at an
animal shelter euthanized a dog after the shelter’s scanner, which only read 125 kHz
microchip, failed to detect the dog’s 134.2 kHz microchip.112 To make matters even
worse, the dog’s “owner called [the] shelter literally half an hour after it had put her
microchipped dog to sleep.”113

107

Steve Dale, Microchipped Pets Likely OK, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Sept. 24, 2007, at 2F.
McGrath, supra note 6.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions About Microchipping of Animals, AM. VETERINARY MED.
ASS’N, http://www.avma.org/issues/microchipping/microchipping_faq.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
108

19

One solution to the multiple frequency problem is a type of scanner, known as a
universal scanner, which can read microchips at any frequency.114 However, because of
encryption, “even the so-called universal scanners don’t always read every chip.”115
Encryption is the “process of encoding information in such a way that only the person (or
computer) with the key can decode it.”116 Using this method, microchip companies
encrypt their microchips, making it such that “only their scanners can read their
microchips,” thus creating an effective monopoly and ensuring a hefty profit from
scanner sales. 117
The second Bush administration attempted to remedy this problem by way of a
provision in the 2006 Agriculture Appropriations bill that commanded the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service to “develop regulations that would require all scanners to
read all chips.”118 Although a good start, an inherent problem with this legislation was
that the “APHIS only exercises authority over organizations that are regulated by the
Animal Welfare Act (AWA), which means it does not have the power to dictate what
private pet owners and retail businesses do.”119 Thus, until all microchips operate at the
same frequency, or shelters have unfettered access to universal scanners, the dangers
associated with frequency variation will remain a legitimate safety concern.
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VI. Does Mandatory Microchipping Constitute a Taking?
The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no State may “deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”120 Additionally, the Fifth
Amendment, incorporated to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment,121 mandates that
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”122
Although mandatory microchipping arguably does not constitute a deprivation of
property, it is a type of regulation that may amount to a taking, and thus require that
compensation be paid to the animal’s owner.
Originally, “compensation was mandated only when the government physically
took property.”123 However, over time, the meaning of the Takings Clause has evolved
to include not only physical appropriations of property, but also government regulation
thereof.124 As the Supreme Court found in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, “the general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”125 The question post- Pennsylvania Coal
remains “how far is too far?”
The Court partially answered this question in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, in which Justice Scalia noted:
[The Court’s] decision in Mahon offered little insight into when, and
under what circumstances, a given regulation would be seen as going ‘too
far’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of succeeding
‘regulatory takings’ jurisprudence, we have generally eschewed any ‘“set
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formula”’ for determining how far is too far, preferring to ‘engage in . . .
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’126
Justice Scalia went on to state that the Court has:
However, described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest
advanced in support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ of his property.
In general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose
behind it, we have required compensation.127

To be sure, mandatory microchipping unassailably constitutes a permanent physical
invasion of the pet owner’s property.128 Thus, it seems fairly clear that, based upon the
Court’s finding in Lucas, pet owners must be compensated. This, of course, is not the
current state of affairs. As it stands now, it is the owners who must pay to have the
microchips implanted.

VII. Do Microchipping Laws Inappropriately Disregard the Unique Property Status
of Companion Animals?
Another argument espoused by opponents of mandatory microchipping is that
because companion animals are a unique type of property, “the final decision about
identification – whether by collar, tattoo or microchip – should be made by the owner,
not the government.”129 Traditionally, the law has treated animals as chattel,
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indistinguishable from inanimate property “like backpacks or bicycles.”130 However, a
growing minority of courts have come to recognize that “a pet . . . is not just a thing but
occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal
property.”131 If ever a majority of courts came to adopt the latter view, one wonders what
the legal ramifications might be.
The idea of animals as property is as old as the common law. In fact, at common
law “dogs were either not considered as property, or were considered as property of an
inferior sort entitled to less protection than other types of personal property.”132 Over
time, however, all domestic animals have come to be universally regarded, via statutes
and court decisions, as personal property.133 And just like other types of personal
property, “we can buy and sell [animals], bequeath them in our wills, give them away or
choose to destroy them” (so long as the animal’s owner does not run afoul of applicable
anti-cruelty statutes).134 However, beginning in the 1960s, a small number of courts
began acknowledging a distinction between companion animals and inanimate forms of
property.135
In 1964, the Supreme Court of Florida decided La Porte v. Associated
Independents, Inc.136 In La Porte, the court dealt with the question of whether a jury
could consider a plaintiff’s mental suffering when assessing damages arising from the
wrongful destruction of a pet.137 Phyllis La Porte was cooking breakfast one morning
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when a trash collector stopped in front of her house to pick up the garbage.138 The
garbage man, after emptying La Porte’s garbage bins, hurled one of the empty bins
toward La Porte’s miniature dachshund, Heidi, who was “tethered” in front of the
house.139 The bin struck Heidi with such a force that the dog died shortly thereafter.140
La Porte responded by bringing an action for damages against the garbage man’s
employer, in which the jury found in La Porte’s favor awarding her both compensatory
and punitive damages.141 The employer appealed the judgment claiming that it was error
for the judge to instruct the jury to consider mental suffering.142 The Second District
Court of Appeals agreed, stating that “[i]t is improper to include an allowance for
sentimental value of the dog to its owner.”143
The Florida Supreme Court ultimately rebuked the finding of the district court,
holding:
The restriction of the loss of a pet to its intrinsic [fair market] value
in circumstances such as the ones before us is a principle we cannot
accept. Without indulging in a decision of the affinity between
‘sentimental value’ and ‘mental suffering,’ we feel that the affection of a
master for his dog is a very real thing and that the malicious destruction of
the pet provides an element of damage for which the owner should
recover.144
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Thus, the court implicitly pronounced that there is something fundamentally distinctive
about companion animals; that the wanton destruction of one’s pet is somehow different
than the wanton destruction of someone’s living room sofa.145
Judge Seymour Friedman rendered a similar, but more expansive, holding in
Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hospital, Inc.146 In Corso, the owner of a fifteen-year-old
poodle brought the dog in to the defendant’s animal hospital.147 The attending
veterinarian recommended euthanasia, and the dog was put down.148 The malfeasance
complained of by the plaintiff arose from the allegation that the hospital had wrongfully
disposed of the dog, and that this disposal frustrated elaborate funeral plans which the
plaintiff had made “including a headstone, an epitaph, and attendance by plaintiff’s two
sisters and a friend.”149 Instead of receiving her beloved, late poodle, plaintiff received a
small casket containing a dead cat.150
After noting the significant “mental distress and anguish” suffered by the plaintiff,
the court ruled that in an action for damages involving the wrongful destruction of a dog,
the amount of damages receivable by the plaintiff is not limited by the fair market value
of the animal.151 Judge Friedman poignantly explained the basis for his ruling: “[i]n
ruling that a pet such as a dog is not just a thing I believe the plaintiff is entitled to
damages beyond the market value of the dog. A pet is not just an inanimate thing that
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just receives affection; it also returns it.”152 The court also distinguished the anguish one
might feel at the loss of a family heirloom:
An heirloom . . . is not capable of returning love and affection. It
does not respond to human stimulation; it has no brain capable of
displaying emotion which in turn causes a human response. . . . But a dog
– that is something else. To say it is a piece of personal property and no
more is a repudiation of our humaneness.153
Of course, there is no shortage of case law contravening the court’s findings in Corso.
For instance, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in Harabes v. Barkery that “[p]ublic
policy considerations prevent pet owners from recovering emotional distress and loss of
companionship damages in connection with the loss of a pet dog.”154 This suggests that
companion animals are no different than other pieces of personal property; that emotional
distress damages for their destruction cannot be had.
However, piggy-backing on the ideas espoused in cases like Corso, that
companion animals are a distinct and unique type of property, is the argument that pet
owners, because of this special property status, should have a choice when it comes to the
method they use to identify their pets (microchip, tattoo, or traditional tag and collar).155
There are two theoretical bases for such an argument, one from law, the other from public
policy; the legal argument being that if the law recognizes the special property status of
companion animals, the government should have a correspondingly heightened burden in
justifying any regulation of such property.156
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While such an argument seems reasonable, the fact remains that property is
property, and thus, from a substantive due-process standpoint, the government can
impose whatever regulations it sees fit upon a person’s property, as long as those
regulations are not unreasonable.157 Pursuant to its police powers, the “government may
act to promote ‘the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,’” and “[s]uch actions
are constitutional unless found to be ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation’ to such goals.”158 Flowing from these police powers is the
government’s “ability to regulate and restrict property use.”159 Because mandatory
microchipping laws are substantially related to legitimate goals, namely the promotion of
public welfare by attempting to reduce the number of dogs and cats euthanized each year,
it is not likely that one could successfully convince a court that such laws are
unreasonable.160 That being said, “[n]o government in history ever admitted that any of
its laws were unreasonable . . . .”161
However, if more courts eventually come to recognize the special property status
of companion animals, a strong public policy-based argument could be made that it
should be the owner’s prerogative, and not that of the government, to choose the method
by which his or her pet is identified. However, as with any argument based on public
policy, the omnipresent, albeit usually unspoken, question exists: what exactly does
public policy mean? The Supreme Court has been reluctant to state a precise
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definition.162 Nevertheless, although public policy is an amorphous concept, “impossible
to define with accuracy,”163 arguments based on public policy generally advocate that a
certain proposal is in “the best interest of the populace.”164 However, whether a proposal
is determined to be in the best interest of the populace is significantly affected by those
lobbying for or against that proposal.165 As Professor Dean G. Kilpatrick has noted,
“public policy debates occur over proposed legislation” and “public policy priorities are
influenced by advocacy.”166 Thus, it is probably in the anti-chippers’ interest to make as
much racket as possible.

VIII. Conclusion
It does not require knowing that 27% of “pet owners buy birthday gifts for their
dogs” to realize most owners genuinely care about their pets.167 In many households, the
resident dog or cat is as much a part of the family as any of the human members. Thus, a
mandate from the government telling pet owners that they must have a potentially cancerinducing microchip permanently implanted into their pet’s body is likely to be met with a
fair amount of skepticism. Of the objections promulgated by opponents of mandatory
microchipping, some have been shown to be rather unfounded, namely the “first pets,
then people” argument.

Other arguments, like the need for legislation protecting against

the improper dissemination of pet owner information, the idea that mandatory chipping
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amounts to a compensatable taking, the notion that companion animals are a unique type
of property, and concerns over the safety of implantable RFID microchips, have all been
shown to present reasonably colorable claims in support of the argument that pet owners,
and not the government, should have the choice over whether to chip their pets.
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